生态经济理论的发展与政治经济学的创新

长期以来,我国社会主义政治经济学由于忽视研究生态经济问题,使之缺乏创新与发展。现在生态经济学得到了迅速的发展,政治经济学必须研究生态经济问题,必须吸收生态经济理论,真正成为社会主义现代化建设的坚实的理论基础。     

论学科交叉路径及趋势

学科交叉是高等学校新学科生长点产生的源泉，是获得原创性科学成果的重要途径。高等学校应大力提倡跨学科研究来推进不同学科的交叉、融合与渗透，以实现学科建设的跨越式发展。     

金融服务外包的风险控制及其监管研究

金融服务外包是金融领域的新兴业务,从国际范围看,金融服务外包行业正处于行业生命周期的高速成长期,尤其是近年来发展迅猛;目前我国金融业务外包已经开始起步并呈现不断发展的趋势。金融服务外包有利于强化金融机构的核心竞争力、规避经营风险和降低经营成本;但也会带来外包失败、成本增加、收益分配的不确定性、战略泄漏等风险。金融机构自身要加强内部控制防范风险,金融监管部门也应加强监管,要合理限定金融服务外包的范围、规范监管机构的权限与监管程序、规范金融机构选择外包商的基本程序和机制、要求金融机构和外包商建立应急机制,并适度从严监管跨国金融服务外包。     

规制分权化、组织合谋与制度效率--基于中国电力行业的实证研究

产业组织理论中关于规制合谋的研究分为芝加哥学派和图卢兹学派，研究结果均表明，规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋行为降低了规制效率．降低了社会福利水平。文章主要研究中国当前规制分权化背景下的地方规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋问题，并且用计量方法对规制的效果进行了检验．结果表明规制分权化没有显著的正面效应，即规制低效率。因此，规制分权化产生的合谋导致了规制低效率．而解决问题的关键是机制设计。     

Financial acumen, women speculators, and the Royal African company during the South Sea bubble

Price bubbles provide a unique opportunity to study the financial acumen of shareholders. We focus on the 1720 South Sea episode as experienced by the Royal African Company whose stock was more speculative than other joint stocks. During 1720 the company had a new large stock issue. This paper examines the financial acumen of those women who traded senior and engrafted stock across 1720. We find that depending on the pricing regime, these women at worst broke even on their activities or had positive speculative gains. Our findings are consistent with a growing literature on the positive link between gender, capital gains and financial markets.     

Benefits of Downward Earnings Management and Political Connection: Evidence from Government Subsidy and Market Pricing

This paper examines the role of downward earnings management and political connection on the receipt of government subsidies and market pricing of subsidies. Using subsidies data hand-collected from Chinese listed firms over the period 2004–2014, the results show a significantly positive association between downward earnings management and the receipt of government subsidies. The results also reveal that a firm's political connection is conducive to securing subsidies for poor performers, but not for good performers. Market pricing analyses demonstrate that share markets value subsidies positively in general, but the effect is ameliorated in firms conducting downward earnings management. No discernible difference is found between the market pricing of subsidies received by firms with political connections and those without.     

Accounting for decarbonisation and reducing capital at risk in the S&P500

This article accounts for carbon emissions in the S&P 500 and explores the extent to which capital is at risk from decarbonising value chains. At a global level it is proving difficult to decouple carbon emissions from GDP growth. Top-down legal and regulatory arrangements envisaged by the Kyoto Protocol are practically redundant given inconsistent political commitment to mitigating global climate change and promoting sustainability. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and European Commission (EC) are promoting the role of financial markets and financial institutions as drivers of behavioural change mobilising capital allocations to decarbonise corporate activity.     

Politically connected boards,value or cost: evidence from a natural experiment in China

This study investigates the net effect of a politically connected board for a firm. Using a natural experiment in China – a regulatory change to forbid bureaucrats from sitting on the board of public firms – we address the causality of the net effect of a politically connected board by testing the market reaction of the shares of firm targeted by the regulatory change to the policy announcement. The stocks of firms with politically connected directors who are targeted by the regulatory change show on average a significantly positive abnormal return, which suggests that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect. The result is robust to various model settings and to a matched sample using the propensity score methodology. Additionally, the announcement effect of the resignation of a politically connected director is significantly positive, and significantly higher than that of a non‐connected director. Overall, our results suggest that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect.     

Political uncertainty and firms' information environment: Evidence from China

How political uncertainty affects the supply of value relevant information about a firm is an important but unresolved question. Using an emerging market setting where political leaders are expected to exert significant influence on economic activities, we examine the effect of political uncertainty caused by turnovers of local government leaders on a firm’s information environment. We find that during periods of political uncertainty, the total amount of idiosyncratic information about a firm that is available to the market is reduced. The adverse effect on information supply is manifest in firms that are more politically dependent and stronger when uncertainty is more severe. Further, we provide evidence suggesting that firms react to political uncertainty by reducing the amount and the quality of information provided to investors. We find that information intermediaries such as financial analysts and the media have a moderating effect on the information environment as they increase the production of information during periods of political uncertainty. However, these intermediaries do not negate the net loss of information.     

Political patronage and analysts’ forecast precision

We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of political patronage, as proxied by government-controlled institutional ownership. The reverse is found for the economic dimension of political patronage, as proxied by the percentage shareholding of government-linked corporations. We find no evidence that the personal dimension of political patronage influences analysts’ forecast precision.